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Abstract—Language-based information flow security aims to
decide whether an action-observable program can unintentionally
leak confidential information if it has the authority to access
confidential data. Recent concerns about declassification polices
have provided many choices for practical intended information
release, but more precise enforcement mechanism for these
policies is insufficiently studied. In this paper, we propose a
security property on the where-dimension of declassification and
present an enforcement based on automated verification. The
approach automatically transforms the abstract model with a
variant of self-composition, and checks the reachability of illegal-
flow state of the model after transformation. The self-composition
is equipped with a store-match pattern to reduce the state space
and to model the equivalence of declassified expressions in the
premise of property. The evaluation shows that our approach is
more precise than type-based enforcement.
Index Terms—information flow security; declassification; push-
down system; program analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Information flow security is concerned with finding new
techniques to ensure that the confidential data will not be
illegally leaked to the public observation. The topic is popular
at both language level and operating system level. Language-
based techniques have been pervasively adopted in the study
on information flow security. This is comprehensively sur-
veyed in [1]. Noninterference [2] is commonly known as the
baseline property of information flow security. The semantic-
based definition of noninterference [3] on batch-job model
characterizes a security condition specifying that the system
behavior is indistinguishable from a perspective of attacker
regardless of the confidential inputs. Noninterference is crit-
icized for the restriction that forbids any flow from high to
low. It will influence the usability of system because the de-
liberate release is pervasive in many situations, e.g. password
authentication, online shopping and encryption. Therefore, it
is important to specify more relaxed and practical policies
for real application scenarios and develop precise enforcement
mechanisms for these policies.
The confidentiality aspect of information downgrading, i.e.
declassification [4], allows information release with different
intentions along four dimensions [5]: what is released, where
does the release happen, when the information can be released
and who releases it. The security policy we propose is on the
where-dimension. On this dimension, there have been several
polices, e.g. intransitive noninterference [6], non-disclosure
[7], WHERE [8], flow locks [9], and gradual release [10].
Each of them leverages a certain category of type system to
enforce the security policy.
In this work, we first use an approach based on automated
verification to enforce declassification policy on the where-
dimension. As a flow-sensitive and context-sensitive tech-
nique, automated verification has been used as an enforcement
to noninterference on both imperative languages [11,12] and
object-oriented languages [13,14]. In these works declassifi-
cation is only discussed in [12], where the specific property
relaxed noninterference [15] is mostly on the what-dimension.
The approaches based on automated verification usually rely
on some form of self-composition [11] that composes the
program model with a variable-renamed copy to reduce the
security property on original model to a safety property on
the model after transformation. In our previous work [14], we
have developed a framework that uses reachability analysis to
ease the specification of temporal logic formula or the manual
assertion encoding partial correctness judgement. The self-
composition doubles the size of memory store and largely
increases the state space of model. When the I/O channels
are considered, this effect becomes more serious since each
store of channel is modeled explicitly. On the other hand, the
security property often requires the equivalence of declassified
expressions to be satisfied. Therefore in our enforcement we
propose a store-match pattern to 1. avoid duplicating the output
channels, and 2. facilitate the self-composition by modeling
the equivalence of declassified expressions in the premise
of security property. We also evaluated the similarity of the
properties and the preciseness of our enforcement mechanism
compared with type system.
The main contributions of the paper include: (i) We propose
a more relaxed security property enforceable with automated
verification on the where-dimension; (ii) We give a flow-
sensitive and context-sensitive enforcement based on reacha-
bility analysis of pushdown system. We show the mechanism
is more precise than type-based approaches; (iii) We propose a
store-match pattern that can be in common use for automated
verifications to reduce the state space of model and the cost
of security analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce the language model and the baseline property.
e ::=v | x | e⊕ e′
C ::=skip | x := e | x := declass(e) | if e then C else C′ |
while e do C | C;C′ | input(x, Ii) | output(e,Oi)
Fig. 1. Program Syntax
(µ, I,O, p, q, skip;C) → (µ, I,O, p, q, C)
µ(e) = v
(µ, I,O, p, q, x := e;C) → (µ[x 7→ v], I,O, p, q, C)
µ(e) = b
(µ, I,O, p, q, if e then Ctrue else Cfalse) → (µ, I,O, p, q, Cb)
µ(e) = true
(µ, I,O, p, q, while e do C) → (µ, I,O, p, q, C;while e do C)
µ(e) = false
(µ, I,O, p, q, while e do C) → (µ, I,O, p, q, skip)
(µ, I,O, p, q, C1) → (µ
′, I′,O′, p′, q′, C′1)
(µ, I,O, p, q, C1;C2) → (µ
′, I′,O′, p′, q′, C′1;C2)
Ii[pi] = v p
′
i = pi + 1
(µ, I,O, p, q, input(x,Ii);C) → (µ[x 7→ v],I,O, p′, q, C)
µ(e) = O′i[qi] q
′
i = qi + 1
(µ, I,O, p, q, output(e,Oi);C) → (µ, I,O′, p, q′, C)
µ(e) = v σ(e)  σ(x)
(µ, I,O, p, q, x := declass(e);C) → (µ[x 7→ v],I,O, p, q, C)
µ(e) = v σ(x) ≺ σ(e) σ(e)  σ(x)
(µ, I,O, p, q, x := declass(e);C) →d (µ[x 7→ v],I,O, p, q, C)
Fig. 2. Operational Semantics
In Section III, we define the where-security and prove the
compliance of property with the prudent principles. Section IV
describes the enforcement mechanism. We show the evaluation
in Section V and conclude in Section VI.
II. PROGRAM MODEL AND BASELINE PROPERTY
We use a sequential imperative language with I/O channels
as the presentation language to illustrate our approach. The
syntax is listed in Fig.1. The language is deterministic. The
primitive declass stands for declassification that downgrades the
confidential data of expression e to be assigned to variable x
with a lower security domain. Here x can be considered as
a low-level sink of data observable to the attacker. I and O
are respectively the set of input and output channels. They are
formally defined as a mapping from each channel identifier i
to a linear list, e.g. Ii resp. Oi. The command input(x, Ii)
indicates that the input from Ii is assigned to x, and the
command output(e,Oi) stores the value of expression e into
the correct position of Oi.
The computation is modeled by the small-step operational
semantics in Fig.2. The inductive rules are defined over
configurations of the form (µ, I,O, p, q, C). µ : Var 7→ N
is a memory store mapping variables to values and C is the
command to be executed. p and q are set of indices. pi denotes
the index of next element to be input from Ii, and qi is the
index of location of Oi where the next output value will be
stored. The elements in p and q are explicitly increased by the
computation of inputs and outputs.
The security policy is a tuple (D,, , σ) where (D,) is
a finite security lattice on security domains and is an excep-
tional downgrading relation of security domains ( ∩ = ∅)
statically gathered from the program. Let σ : Var∪I∪O 7→ D
be the mapping from I/O channels and variables to security
domains, and let σ(e) ≡
⊔
x∈e σ(x) be the least upper bound
of the security domains of variables contained in e. When com-
mand x := declass(e) in program has σ(x) ≺ σ(e), the declass
operation performs a real downgrading from some variable in
e and only then an element (σ(e), σ(x)) is contained in the
relation , otherwise the operation is identical to an ordinary
assignment. We label the transition of declassification with
→d in Fig.2. The security policy is different from the MLS
policy with exceptions proposed in [6,8,16], where the set of
exceptional relations  is independent to the declassification
operations. In our policy the exceptions are gathered from the
declass commands. Our treatment is reasonable since developer
should have right to decide the exception when they use the
primitive declass explicitly. This is also supported in other
work, e.g. [17].
We specify noninterference with the semantic-based PER-
model [3]. Intuitively speaking, it specifies a relation between
states of any two correlative runs of program, which is
variation in the confidential initial state cannot cause variation
in the public final state. In another word, the runs starting
from indistinguishable initial states derive indistinguishable
final states as well. For the language with I/Os, the indistin-
guishability relation on memory stores and I/O channels with
respect to certain security domain ℓ is defined as below.
Definition 1 (ℓ-indistinguishability). Memory store µi and µj
are indistinguishable on ℓ(ℓ ∈ D), denoted by µi ∼ℓ µj , iff
∀x ∈ Var.σ(x)  ℓ ⇒ µi(x) = µj(x). For input channel Ii
and Ij , Ii ∼ℓ Ij iff (σ(Ii) = σ(Ij)  ℓ) ∧ (pi = pj ∧ ∀0 ≤
k < pi.Ii[k] = Ij [k]). Similarly, for output channel Oi and
Oj , Oi ∼ℓ Oj iff (σ(Oi) = σ(Oj)  ℓ) ∧ (qi = qj ∧ ∀0 ≤
k < qi.Oi[k] = Oj [k]).
For the two observable channels with same security domain,
the indistinguishable linear lists should have the same length
and identical content. Let Iℓ be the set of input channels
with security domain ℓ′(ℓ′  ℓ). If the set I and I ′ have
the same domain, e.g. as the inputs of the same program, we
can use I ∼ℓ I ′ to express ∀i.Ii ∈ Iℓ ⇒ Ii ∼ℓ I ′i . The
noninterference formalized here takes into consideration the
I/O channels and is therefore different from what for batch-
job model [1]. It is given as follows.
Definition 2 (Noninterference). Program P satisfies noninter-
ference w.r.t. security domain ℓ0, iff ∀ℓ  ℓ0, we have(
∀I, µ, I ′, µ′,Of , µf .(µ, I,O, p, q, P ) →∗
(µf , I,Of , pf , qf , skip) ∧ I ∼ℓ I ′ ∧ µ ∼ℓ µ′
)
⇒
(
∃O′f , µ
′
f .(µ
′, I ′,O′, p′, q′, P ) →∗
(µ′f , I
′,O′f , p
′
f , q
′
f , skip) ∧ Of ∼ℓ O′f ∧ µf ∼ℓ µ′f
)
.
In this definition, the noninterference property is related to
a security domain ℓ0. The content of channels with security
domain ℓ′(ℓ′ ≻ ℓ0) is unobservable and irrelevant to the
property. A more specific way to define noninterference is to
require ℓ0 =
⊔
D. That means the proposition in Definition 2
has to be satisfied for each security domain in D. We use this
definition in the following. Our definition adopts a manner to
consider the indistinguishability of the initial and final states
but not to characterize the relation in each computation step
as did by the bisimulation-based approach [18]. Another use
of the security domain of variables is to specify where a valid
declassification occurs. This will be discussed below.
III. WHERE-SECURITY AND PRUDENT PRINCIPLES
In this section, we give a security condition to control the
legitimate release of confidential information on the where-
dimension of security goals. It considers both the code locality
where the release occurs and the level locality to which secu-
rity domain the release is legal. Let ։ represent a (possible
empty) sequence of declassification-free transitions. A trace
of computations is separated to the declassifications labeled
with →d and declassification-free computation sequences. The
where-security is formally specified as below.
Definition 3 (Where-Security). Program P satisfies where-
security iff ∀ℓ ∈ D, we have
∀I, µ, I′, µ′.∃n ≥ 0 :

∀On+1, µn+1 : (µ, I,O, p, q, P )[։ (µks , I,Ok, pk, qk,
xk := declass(ek);Pk)→d (µkt , I,Ok, pk, qk, Pk)]k=1..n
։ (µn+1, I,On+1, pn+1, qn+1, skip)
∧I ∼ℓ I
′ ∧ µ ∼ℓ µ
′

⇒


∃O′n+1, µ
′
n+1 : (µ
′, I′,O′, p′, q′, P )[։ (µ′ks , I
′,O′k, p
′
k, q
′
k,
x′k := declass(e
′
k);P
′
k)→d (µ
′
kt
, I′,O′k, p
′
k, q
′
k, P
′
k)]k=1..n
։ (µ′n+1, I
′,O′n+1, pn+1, q
′
n+1, skip)
∧
∧
k=1..n
(µks ∼ℓ µ
′
ks
∧ µks(ek) = µ
′
ks
(e′k)⇒ µkt ∼ℓ µ
′
kt
)
∧
( ∧
k=1..n
(µks(ek) = µ
′
ks
(e′k))⇒
µn+1 ∼ℓ µ
′
n+1 ∧On+1 ∼ℓ O
′
n+1
)


Intuitively speaking, when the indistinguishable relation on
the final states is violated, the contrapositive implies that it
is caused by the variation of declassified expressions. This
variation is indicated valid by the premise our property. If the
leakage of confidential information is caused by a computation
other than the primitive declass, it will be captured because
without constraining the equality of released expression, the fi-
nal indistinguishability cannot hold. Our where-security prop-
erty is more relaxed than WHERE [8,16] which uses strong-
bisimulation and requires each declassification-free compu-
tation step meets the baseline noninterference. We can use
explicit final output of public variables to adapt the judgement
of µn+1 ∼ℓ µ′n+1 to the judgement of On+1 ∼ℓ O′n+1.
Sabelfeld and Sands [5] clarify four basic prudent principles
for declassification policies as sanity checks for the new
definition: semantic consistency, conservativity, monotonicity
of release, and non-occlusion. Our where-security property
can be proved to comply with the first three principles. Let
P [C] represent a program contains command C. P [C′/C]
substitutes each occurrence of C in P with C′. The principles
with respect to the where-security are defined as follows.
Lemma 1 (Semantic Consistency). Suppose C and C′ are
declassification-free commands and semantically equivalent
on the same domain of configuration. If program P [C] is
where-secure, the P [C′/C] is where-secure.
Lemma 2 (Conservativity). If program P is where-secure and
P contains no declassification, then P satisfies noninterfer-
ence property.
Lemma 3 (Monotonicity of Release). If program P [x := e] is
where-secure, then P [x := declass(e)/x := e] is where-secure.
Corollary 1. The where-security satisfies semantic consis-
tency, conservativity, and monotonicity of release.
This corollary indicates that the where-security complies
with the three prudent principles given by the above lemmas.
The proofs of the lemmas are presented in [19]. The non-
occlusion principle cannot be formally proved since a proof
would require a characterization of secure information flow
which is what we want to check against the prudent principles.
IV. ENFORCEMENT
In this section, we provide a new enforcement for the
where-security based on reachability analysis of symbolic
pushdown system [20]. A pushdown system is a stack-based
state transition system whose stack contained in each state can
be unbounded. It is a natural model of sequential program
with procedures. Symbolic pushdown system is a compact
representation of pushdown system encoding the variables and
computations symbolically.
Definition 4 (Symbolic Pushdown System, SPDS). Symbolic
Pushdown System is a triple P = (G,Γ × L,∆). G and L
are respectively the domain of global variables and local
variables. Γ is the stack alphabet. ∆ is the set of symbolic
pushdown rules {〈γ〉 →֒ 〈γ1 · · · γn〉(R) | γ, γ1, · · · , γn ∈
Γ ∧R ⊆ (G × L)× (G × Ln) ∧ n ≤ 2}.
The stack symbols denote the flow graph nodes of program.
The relation R specifies the variation of abstract variables
before and after a single step of symbolic execution directed
by the pushdown rules. The operations on R are compactedly
implemented with binary decision diagrams (BDDs) [21] in
Moped [22] which we use as the back-end verification engine.
The model construction of commands other than I/O op-
erations is similar to the one in our previous work [23]. In
the pushdown system, the public channels are represented by
global linear lists. In another word, for a security domain
ℓ ∈ D, we only model the channels in Iℓ and Oℓ. Take a
input command for example, if the source channel is Ii, the
pushdown rule has a form of IRH for σ(Ii) ≻ ℓ and IRL for
σ(Ii)  ℓ in Table I, where ⊥ denotes an indefinite value.
TABLE I
PDS RULES FOR MODEL CONSTRUCTION
IRH 〈γj〉 →֒ 〈γk〉 (x′ = ⊥) ∧ rt(µ \ {x}, Iℓ,Oℓ, pℓ, qℓ, · · · )
IRL 〈γj〉 →֒ 〈γk〉 (x′ = Ii[pi]) ∧ (p′i = pi + 1) ∧ rt(µ \ {x}, I
ℓ,Oℓ, pℓ \ {pi}, qℓ, · · · )
ORH 〈γj 〉 →֒ 〈γk〉 rt(µ, Iℓ,Oℓ, pℓ, qℓ, · · · )
ORL 〈γj〉 →֒ 〈outputentryγk〉 (tmp′ = e) ∧ rt(µ, Iℓ,Oℓ, pℓ, qℓ, · · · ) ∧ rt2(· · · )
〈outputexit〉 →֒ 〈ǫ〉 rt(µ, Iℓ,Oℓ, pℓ, qℓ, · · · )
DR 〈γj〉 →֒ 〈declass
γj
entry〉 (tmp′ = e) ∧ rt(µ, Iℓ,Oℓ, pℓ, qℓ, · · · )
〈declass
γj
exit〉 →֒ 〈γk〉 rt(µ, I
ℓ,Oℓ, pℓ, qℓ, · · · )
TABLE II
STUFFER PDS RULES FOR MODEL TRANSFORMATION
RST 〈γj〉 →֒ 〈ξ(γ0)〉 (∀pi ∈ pℓ.p′i = 0) ∧ (∀qi ∈ qℓ.q′i = 0) ∧ rt(µ, ξ(µ), Iℓ,Oℓ, · · · )
OSi 〈outputentry〉 →֒ 〈outputexit〉 (O′i[qi] = tmp) ∧ (q′i = qi + 1) ∧ rt(µ, ξ(µ), Iℓ,Oℓ \ {Oi[qi]}, pℓ, qℓ \ {qi}, · · · )
OMi 〈ξ(outputentry)〉 →֒ 〈error〉 (Oi[qi] 6= tmp) ∧ rt(· · · )
〈ξ(outputentry)〉 →֒ 〈ξ(outputexit)〉 (Oi[qi] = tmp) ∧ (q′i = qi + 1) ∧ rt(µ, ξ(µ), I
ℓ,Oℓ, pℓ, qℓ \ {qi}, · · · )
DSγj 〈declass
γj
entry〉 →֒ 〈declass
γj
exit〉 (D
′[ρ(γj)] = tmp) ∧ (x′ = tmp) ∧ rt(D \ {D[ρ(γj)]}, µ \ {x}, ξ(µ), · · · )
DMγj 〈ξ(declass
γj
entry)〉 →֒ 〈idle〉 (D[ρ(γj)] 6= tmp) ∧ rt(D, · · · )
〈ξ(declass
γj
entry)〉 →֒ 〈ξ(declass
γj
exit)〉 (D[ρ(γj)] = tmp) ∧ (ξ(x)
′ = tmp) ∧ rt(D, µ, ξ(µ) \ {ξ(x)}, · · · )
On the other hand, if the target channel of output is Oi, the
pushdown rule has a form of ORH for σ(Oi) ≻ ℓ and ORL
for σ(Oi)  ℓ in Table I. ORH is just like a transition of
skip since the confidential outputs do not influence the public
part of subsequent states. The variable tmp stores the value of
expression to be outputted or declassified. rt means retainment
on value of global variables and on value of local variables
in 〈γj〉 →֒ 〈γk〉. rt2 for a rule 〈γj〉 →֒ 〈fentryγk〉 denotes
retainment on value of local variables of the caller of procedure
f. The declassifications are modeled with DR in Table I. The
bodies of outputs to different public channel and the bodies of
declassifications are vacuous. These absent parts of model will
be filled by the self-composition. This treatment is decided
by the store-match pattern which we develop to avoid the
duplication of public channels and to guide the instrumented
computation to fulfil the premise of where-security property.
We follow the principle of reachability analysis for nonin-
terference which we proposed in [14]. The self-composition
is evolved into three phases: basic self-composition, auxiliary
initial interleaving assignments, and illegal-flow state con-
struction. For simplicity, we use the compact self-composition
[23] as basic self-composition. To avoid duplicating the input
channels, we reuse the content of public input channels by
resetting the indices of pℓ to 0 at the beginning of the pairing
part of model, see RST in Table II. This treatment is safe
because from the semantics we know that no computation
actually modifies the content of input channels. In order to
avoid duplicating the output channels, we propose a store-
match pattern of output actions. This is to stuff the model after
basic self-composition with the pushdown rules OS and OM in
Table II parameterized with the channel identifier i. The OM
rules show that when the output to channel Oi is computed in
the second run, it is compared with the corresponding output
stored during the first run. If they are not equal, the symbolic
Algorithm 1 Model Transformation
1. ∆′ ← {〈γinit〉 →֒ 〈startConf(P)〉 (∀x ∈ dom(µℓ).ξ(x)′ = x) ∧
rt(µ, Iℓ,Oℓ, pℓ, qℓ)}
2. for all r ∈ ∆ ∧ r 6= LastTrans(P) do
3. ∆′ ← ∆′ ∪ {r.expr r.R∧ rt(ξ(µ))}
4. end for
5. for all r ∈ ∆ do
6. if r.expr = 〈γj〉 →֒ 〈γsγk〉 then
7. ∆′ ← ∆′ ∪ {〈ξ(γj)〉 →֒ 〈ξ(γs)ξ(γk)〉 r.R
ξ(x)
x∈Var ∧ rt(µ)}
8. else if r.expr = 〈γj〉 →֒ 〈declass
γj
entry〉 then
9. ∆′ ← ∆′∪{〈ξ(γj)〉 →֒ 〈ξ(declass
γj
entry)〉 r.R
ξ(x)
x∈Var∧rt(µ)}∪DSγj ∪DMγj
10. else if r.expr = 〈γj〉 →֒ 〈γk〉 then
11. ∆′ ← ∆′ ∪ {〈ξ(γj)〉 →֒ 〈ξ(γk)〉 r.Rξ(x)x∈Var ∧ rt(µ)}
12. else if r 6= LastTrans(P) then
13. ∆′ ← ∆′ ∪ {〈ξ(γj)〉 →֒ 〈ǫ〉 r.Rξ(x)x∈Var ∧ rt(µ)}
14. else
15. ∆′ ← ∆′ ∪ {〈ξ(γj)〉 →֒ 〈ξ(γj)〉 r.Rξ(x)x∈Var ∧ rt(µ)} ∪ {〈γj〉 →֒
〈ξ(startConf(P))〉 RST}
16. end if
17. end for
18. ∆′ ← ∆′ ∪
⋃
Oi∈O
ℓ (OSi ∪ OMi)
execution is directed to the illegal-flow state error.
Compared with the noninterference property, the premise of
where-security contains equality relations on the declassified
expressions, therefore we need some structure to instrument
the semantics of abstract model to make sure the computation
can proceed only when the equality relations are satisfied.
We define another global linear list D. Suppose there are m
declassifications respectively at code location γdi(0 ≤ i < m)
and a function ρ mapping γdi to i. We give another pattern of
store-match that stores the value of expression declassified at
γdi to the site D[ρ(γdi)], see DS in Table II. The corresponding
match operation has a form of DM in Table II. Note that ξ
is the rename function on the stack symbols to generate new
flow graph nodes as well as on the variables to generate the
companion variables for the pairing part of model. The state
idle has only itself as the next state. From the reachability of
error we can ensure the violation of where-security without
TABLE III
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROPERTIES
WHERE gradual release where
noninterference up-to X X ×
persistence X × ×
considering the equality relations on the subsequent outputs.
The self-composition algorithm is given in Algorithm 1. The
LastTrans returns the pushdown rule with respect to the last
return command of program. The first rule added to ∆′ denotes
the initial interleaving assignments from public variables to
their companion variables. r.Rξ(x)x∈Var means a relation substitut-
ing each variable in Var with the renamed companion variable.
Theorem 1 (Correctness). Let SC(Pℓ) be the pushdown sys-
tem w.r.t. security domain ℓ generated by our self-composition
on the model of program P . If ∀ℓ ∈ D, the state error of
SC(Pℓ) is unreachable from any initial state, we have P
satisfies the where-security.
(The proof is sketched in the technical report [19])
V. EVALUATION
We implement Algorithm 1 as part of the parser of Remopla
[24] and use Moped as the black-box back-end engine for the
reachability analysis. Here we use experiments to evaluate:
1. whether the property defined by where-security is similar to
the existing properties on the where-dimension, e.g. [8,10],
and what is the real difference between these properties.
2. the preciseness of the mechanism compared with the type
systems on enforcing the respective security properties.
3. whether the store-match pattern can really reduce the state
space as well as the cost of verification.
The experiments are performed on a laptop with 1.66GHz Intel
Core 2 CPU, 1GB RAM and Linux kernel 2.6.27-14-generic.
The test cases are chosen from related works, see Table IV.
Firstly, we illustrate that where-security is more relaxed than
WHERE [8,16] and gradual release [10]. Lux and Mantel [16]
have proposed another two prudent principles: noninterference
up-to and persistence. Compared with the four basic princi-
ples, the two principles are not generally used for policies
on different dimensions. The conformances of the properties
with these principles are given in Table III. Similar to the
gradual release, the program P1 in Table IV is secure (denoted
by X) w.r.t. where-security. This indicates the two properties
do not comply with persistence since the reachable command
l := h is obviously not secure. On the contrary, WHERE
rejects this program. Our where-security does not comply with
noninterference up-to because the definition deduces relations
on final states but not on the states before declass primitives. A
typical example is P0. It is where-secure but judged insecure
by WHERE and gradual release. Although different on these
special cases, the where-security can characterize a similar
property to WHERE and gradual release for the most cases in
Table IV, see the column WHERE, GR and where.
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8
1E-4
1E-3
0.01
Ti
m
e(
s)
 Tr
 RA
Fig. 3. Cost Reduction with Store-Match Pattern
Then we evaluate the preciseness of our enforcement mech-
anism. In Table IV τ1 is the well-typeness of program judged
by the type system in Fig.4, [8]. τ2 is the judgement of
the type system given in Fig.3, [10]. RA is the reachability
analysis result using our mechanism. Xmeans the state error
is not reachable. The analysis time T is related to the number
of bits of each variable, which we set to 3 and that means
each variable in the model has a range of 0∼23-1. Larger
number of bits corresponds to the increase on state space of
model and the analysis time. On the other hand, the number
of bits of variable is meaningful also because if it is too
small for the model of insecure program, the illegal path
cannot be caught. This causes a false-positive which can be
avoided by setting the number of bits of variable sufficiently
large. We record the minimum number of bits to avoid false-
positive as Nmin. The analysis might be time consuming
when Nmin is large. For secure program, the illegal-flow
state will be unreachable for any number of bits therefore
Nmin is not recorded. The program filter in Table IV has
a more complex policy. From the escape hatch information
we have reader  network. The model is constructed and
transformed on respective security domains. On each security
domain different public variables are modeled outputted in the
end and state error of transformed model is unreachable. Our
enforcement is more precise compared with the type systems
that reject some secure programs (P2,P6,P7 for WHERE and
P1,P2,P6 for gradual release).
Finally, we evaluate the reduction on the cost of verifica-
tion provided by the store-match pattern. We compare our
mechanism with a model transformation, i.e. Tr in Fig.3,
which duplicates the public output channels and constructs the
illegal-flow state following the pairing part of model. The test
cases containing I/Os are from Fig.4, [26], and named F1∼F8
in Fig.3. These experiments show that the store-match pattern
can give an overall 41.4% reduction on the cost of verification.
The number of bits of variable is set to 3 as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
We propose a security property on the where-dimension
of declassification. The property is proved complying with
the three classical prudent principles. We also give a precise
enforcement based on the reachability analysis of pushdown
system derived by a variant of self-composition. To immi-
grate our approach to the properties on other dimensions of
declassification, e.g. the delimited release [17] on the what-
TABLE IV
PROPERTY AND ENFORCEMENT COMPARISON WITH WHERE AND GRADUAL RELEASE
Case From WHERE τ1 GR τ2 where RA T(ms) Nmin
Ex2 Example 2, [6] × × × × × × 39.2 2
RSA Example 5, [6] × × × × × × 1.09 1
C1 Example 1, [8] × × × × × × 0.55 1
C2 Example 1, [8] X X X X X X 0.59 –
C3 Example 1, [8] X X X X X X 0.49 –
filter Fig.6, [8] X X X X X X 5.47 –
P0 Sec.1, [25] × × × × X X 0.44 –
P1 Sec.2, [10] × × X × X X 0.53 –
P2 Sec.3, [25] X × X × X X 0.64 –
P3 Sec.2, [10] × × × × × × 3.53 1
P4 Sec.4, [25] × × × × × × 2.03 1
P5 Sec.4, [25] × × × × × × 0.61 1
P6 Sec.5, [25] X × X × X X 0.37 –
P7 Sec.2, [10] X × X X X X 1.91 –
P0 l := h; l := declass(h);
P1 l := declass(h); l := h;
P2 h1 := h2; l := declass(h1);
P3 h1 := h2;h2 := 0;
l1 := declass(h2);h2 := h1; l2 := h2;
P4 h2 := 0;
if h1 then l := declass(h1)
else l := declass(h2);
P5 l := 0;
if l then l := declass(h) else skip;
l := h;
P6 h2 := 0;
if h1 then l := declass(h2) else l := 0;
P7 l := declass(h! = 0);
if l then l1 := declass(h1) else skip;
dimension, the key point is to focus on the indistinguishability
of declassified expressions on the pair of initial states. The
study on the enforcement of properties on the other dimensions
is left to our future work.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose any trace of the program
P [C′/C] is in a form of
(µ, I,O, p, q, P [C′/C]) →∗ (µj , I,Oj , pj , qj , C′;Pj) ։
(µk, I,Ok, pk, qk, Pj)→∗ (µf , I,Of , pf , qf , skip).
Because C and C′ are semantically equivalent, we also have
(µj , I,Oj , pj , qj , C;Pj)։ (µk, I,Ok, pk, qk, Pj). Moreover,
since C and C′ are declassification-free, the substitution will
not influence the conjunction of equivalence on declassified
expressions in P [C′/C]. Therefore the indistinguishability on
the final configurations, that is µn+1 ∼ℓ µ′n+1 ∧ On+1 ∼ℓ
O′n+1, holds before and after the substitution.
Proof of Lemma 2: From the operational semantics we
can see →d can only occurs when a declass command is
executed and the declassified expression contains some in-
formation with a security domain higher than the security
domain of x. P has no declassification implies that in any
trace of computation of P there is no →d. The where-security
of P degenerates to have n = 0. Therefore the where-
security becomes noninterference according to the definition
and µf ≡ µ1,Of ≡ O1.
Proof of Lemma 3: There are actually two cases on
whether the substitution introduces a real declassification.
1. If σ(e)  σ(x), the computation of x := declass(e) is iden-
tical to the ordinary assignment x := e and → is not labeled
as →d. The where-security of P [x := declass(e)/x := e]
does not change compared with the where-security of
P [x := e].
2. Suppose we have σ(x) ≺ σ(e). The computation of
x := e in the two correlative runs of P [x := e] are like
(µ, I,O, p, q, P [x := e]) →∗ (µj , I,Oj , pj, qj , x :=
e;Pj) → (µj [x 7→ µj(e)], I,Oj , pj , qj , Pj) →∗
(µn+1, I,On+1, pn+1, qn+1, skip) and
(µ′, I ′,O′, p′, q′, P [x := e]) →∗ (µ′j , I
′,O′j , p
′
j, q
′
j , x :=
e;Pj) → (µ′j [x 7→ µ
′
j(e)], I
′,O′j , p
′
j, q
′
j , P
′
j) →
∗
(µ′n+1, I
′,O′n+1, p
′
n+1, q
′
n+1, skip). From the premise
of where-security of P [x := declass(e)/x := e] we
have
∧
k=1..n(µks ∼ℓ µ
′
ks
∧ µks(ek) = µ
′
ks
(ek)). That
implies
∧
k=1..n,k 6=j(µks ∼ℓ µ
′
ks
∧ µks(ek) = µ
′
ks
(ek))
and because P [x := e] is where-secure,
we have
∧
k=1..n,k 6=j(µkt ∼ℓ µ
′
kt
). Because
µj ∼ℓ µ′j ∧ µj(e) = µ
′
j(e), according to the semantics,
we have µj [x 7→ µj(e)] ∼ℓ µ′j [x 7→ µ′j(e)], that is
µjt ∼ℓ µ
′
jt
for P [x := declass(e)/x := e] and therefore∧
k=1..n(µkt ∼ℓ µ
′
kt
). On the other hand, since the
substitution does not change the semantics of program,
restricting the premise
∧
k=1..n,k 6=j(µks(ek) = µ
′
ks
(e′k))
with a conjunction to µj(e) = µ′j(e) will not influence the
consequence that µn+1 ∼ℓ µ′n+1 ∧ On+1 ∼ℓ O′n+1. The
where-security of P [x := declass(e)/x := e] is proved.
Proof of Theorem 1: Suppose program P violates the
where-security property, that means
∃k0.µk0,s ∼ℓ µ
′
k0,s
∧µk0,s(ek) = µ
′
k0,s
(e′k)∧¬(µk0,t ∼ℓ µ
′
k0,t
)
or ∧
k=1..n
(µks(ek) = µ
′
ks
(e′k)) ∧ ¬(On+1 ∼ℓ O
′
n+1)
Here the µn+1 ∼ℓ µ′n+1 has been adapted to On+1 ∼ℓ O′n+1
by modeling final outputs of public variables. If the first
relation is satisfied, we have in xk := declass(ek) and x′k :=
declass(e′k) the variable xk and x′k are different variables.
Therefore the respective pushdown rules must have different
γj as the label for the stack symbol declassγjentry, which we
suppose to be γk, γk′ and γk 6= γk′ . From the DSγk and
DMγk′ we have D[ρ(γk′ )] = e
′
k. The value in D[ρ(γk′ )] is
irrelevant to ek and xk in the second run is not restricted by
DMγk′ . When the final xk and x
′
k are outputted, the inequality
of final xk of correlative executions makes the state error
reachable according to the rule OMσ(xk). If the second relation
is satisfied, ∃i.qi 6= q′i ∨ (∃0 ≤ k0 < qi.Oi[k0] 6= O′i[k0]). If
qi 6= q′i, we can suppose qi < q′i because the correlative runs
are symmetrical. Then there must be some e of output(e,O′i)
in P that should be compared with the indefinite value in
Oi,n+1[qi] during the execution of the second run. Otherwise
we have Oi,n+1[k0] 6= O′i,n+1[k0]. Then if O′i,n+1[k0] is
generated by output(e,Oi), the second run is directed by
Oi[k0] 6= e according to the rule OMi and error is reachable.
From the contrapositive the theorem is proved.
